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Executive summary 
The European Union (EU) has set new priorities to respond to new challenges such as climate change, migration and security 
while Brexit risks unbalancing the EU budget. Ahead of the post-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), there are 
heightened demands for Cohesion Policy (CP) funding, also referred to as European Structural and Investment Funds (ESI 
Funds), to be reduced in the EU funding strategy, either in line with the overall budget reduction or, more radically, as a 
lower share of the total budget than was the case in previous programming periods. Comprising 34% of EU expenditure, the 
reform of Cohesion Policy will represent a major element of the upcoming MFF debate. 
In this context, there is a growing consensus that CP – its objectives, conditionalities and budget allocation – must be 
reformed to address today’s needs. There is no agreement, however, on the nature of a possible reform. A wide range of 
proposals have emerged on how the ESI Funds could be increasingly tied to European values (e.g. respect of the rule of 
law, integration of migrants) or economic governance objectives (e.g. EU growth targets or the reduction of fiscal and 
macroeconomic imbalances). The community in charge of implementing CP (referred to as the ‘CP community’) is concerned 
that proposed reforms may result in additional responsibilities that risk diluting – or further complicating the realisation of – 
the original mandate of economic, social and territorial convergence. 
A critical element of the future CP debate will be the proposal to bolster the link between ESI Funds and the EU’s enhanced 
economic governance system, a set of rules and conditions that have been adopted during the eurozone crisis. 
This study draws on desk research, a series of semi-structured interviews and data gathered during a workshop held on 31 
May 2017 at the European Policy Centre (EPC). It examines the scope for strengthening the link between Cohesion Policy 
and EU economic governance objectives in the next Multiannual Financial Framework by looking more specifically at two 
instruments: ex-ante and macroeconomic conditionalities. 
Our research has identified three major challenges in this regard: 
 A lack of clarity about the purpose and nature of structural reforms, including their role in boosting the effectiveness of 
ESI Funds; 
 A possible conflict between the stability objectives of macroeconomic conditionality and Cohesion Policy’s long-
standing pursuit of growth and investment; 
 A set of political economy constraints that have, so far, prevented the adoption of the coercitive measures aimed at 
correcting macroeconomic or fiscal imbalances in member states. This, in turn, limits the impact of ESI Funds on boosting 
the impetus for macroeconomic stability. 
In this study, the authors suggest that the post-2020 MFF constitutes a window of opportunity to reform Cohesion Policy 
and position it more clearly in the EU’s funding strategy. Our findings indicate that the integration of economic governance 
objectives into CP can help showcase EU added value in the growth and investment agenda. For this, there is a need to 
reframe the political vision linking ESI Funds to economic governance. This requires taking a holistic perspective that 
moves beyond the focus on macroeconomic stability and positioning sound economic governance in the wide spectrum of 
EU objectives and policies. 
The report thus presents a set of strategic and concrete recommendations for how Cohesion Policy could be reformed to 
strengthen the link between its objectives and tools (e.g. ESI Funds) with those of the EU’s economic governance. We notably 
propose that the Commission take a role of ‘strategic enabler’ in the implementation of the EU’s growth agenda by re-
positioning growth-enhancing reforms and reforms linked to CP’s cohesion objectives at the heart of a new growth strategy 
for the EU. Accordingly, we recommend to: 
 Clarify the added value of EU action in regions by clearly defining the EU’s economic governance objectives and the 
role of its policies (namely CP) and providing evidence of how the Union can help achieve them; 
 Provide a stronger rationale for growth-enhacing reforms by better linking reforms to all relevant EU policies and 
integrating them into a new, more comprehensive strategy for growth and cohesion in Europe; 
 Lay out how ESI Funds can contribute to the EU’s growth and cohesion objectives thanks to a reform package 
that builds on existing pre-conditions attached to the disbursement of ESI Funds. The macroeconomic conditionality 
should be considered as part of this ‘package’ and its status revised to an ex-ante measure; 
 Build a stronger regional ownership of the EU’s economic governance agenda by increasing the involvement of 
subnational players in the EU’s economic governance processes and ensuring that conditionalities on ESI Funds are 
better aligned with CP’s objectives of economic, social and territorial cohesion. 
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Résumé 
L’Union Européenne (UE) s'est fixée de nouvelles priorités pour répondre aux défis de notre temps, au premier rang 
desquels la lutte contre le changement climatique, le développement d’une politique migratoire commune et le 
renforcement de sa politique de sécurité et de défense. Dans le même temps, la sortie programmée du Royaume-Uni 
(Brexit) laisse planer le risque d’une réduction substantielle du budget européen. A l’aube des négociations sur le Cadre 
Financier Pluriannuel (CFP), des voix s’élèvent pour demander une réduction du budget de la politique de cohésion 
(aussi appelés Fonds structurels et d’investissement européens (Fonds ESI)), proportionnelle à la réduction éventuelle du 
budget global de l’Union européenne. Certains évoquent même une diminution de la part du budget total qui lui était 
traditionnellement réservée. Représentant 34% des dépenses de l’UE, la politique de cohésion constituera un élément  
majeur des débats sur le futur CFP. 
Dans ce contexte, une réforme de la politique de cohésion – ses objectifs, leur allocation budgétaire et les modalités 
d’obtention des crédits – semble s’imposer. Le débat reste toutefois entier sur le contenu et la nature de la réforme. 
Plusieurs propositions récentes soutiennent le besoin de lier davantage les Fonds ESI aux valeurs européennes (telles 
que le respect de l’Etat de droit ou l’intégration des migrants) ou à des objectifs de politique économique (objectifs de 
croissance ; réduction des déséquilibres macroéconomiques et fiscaux). Ces propositions inquiètent les parties prenantes 
qui mettent en œuvre la politique de cohésion. Elles craignent que les réformes annoncées diluent son mandat 
historique– le soutien à la cohésion économique, sociale et territoriale de l’UE – au service d’une myriade d’objectifs aux 
champs d’application mal définis. 
La proposition de conditionner davantage le recours aux Fonds ESI au respect des règles et objectifs de la gouvernance 
économique de l’UE est au cœur du débat sur la réforme de la politique de cohésion. 
Cette étude se fonde sur un travail de recherche documentaire, une série d’entretiens semi-structurés, et les 
conclusions d’une table-ronde organisée au European Policy Centre (EPC) le 31 Mai 2017. Elle se penche sur 
l’opportunité et les modalités d’un rapprochement de la politique de cohésion et des objectifs de gouvernance 
économique de l’UE dans le cadre du prochain CFP. Cette analyse se concentre sur deux instruments : les 
conditionnalités ex-ante et macro-économique.  
A ce propos, cette recherche identifie trois défis majeurs pour la mise en œuvre d’une telle réforme :  
 un manque de clarté quant à la nature et la finalité des réformes structurelles et leur rôle dans l’amélioration de 
l’efficacité des Fonds ESI ; 
 la perception d’un antagonisme entre les objectifs de la conditionnalité macroéconomique et les objectifs de 
croissance et d’investissement poursuivis par la politique de cohésion; 
 des contraintes d’ordre politique qui limitent les fonds européens dans le rôle de catalyseur de réformes visant à 
soutenir la stabilité macroéconomique (comme l’a montré la difficile mise en application des sanctions prévues par le 
mécanisme de conditionnalité macroéconomique). 
Les auteurs soutiennent d’abord que l’ouverture des discussions sur le prochain CFP offre une fenêtre d’opportunité 
pour réformer la politique de cohésion et la resituer au sein de la stratégie financière de l’UE. Notre analyse révèle que 
l’objectif d’une gouvernance économique saine pourrait devenir un élément majeur de la « valeur ajoutée » que peut 
apporter une politique européenne dans le domaine de la croissance et des investissements. Pour se faire, un nouveau 
souffle politique est requis pour défendre la pertinence et l’efficacité d’une utilisation des Fonds ESI au service des 
objectifs de gouvernance économique de l’UE. Il convient en conséquent de suivre une approche intégrée du rôle de la 
gouvernance économique dans l’ensemble des objectifs et des politiques de l’UE et de dépasser la seule logique de 
stabilité macroéconomique qui prévaut aujourd’hui.  
In fine, les auteurs proposent plusieurs recommandations pour permettre une plus grande complémentarité entre les 
objectifs et instruments des Fonds ESI et les priorités de la gouvernance économique européenne. Nous proposons que 
la Commission assume un role de ‘catalyseur stratégique’ dans la mise en application de l’agenda de croissance 
de l’Union, en repositionnant les réformes structurelles et de croissance au coeur d’une nouvelle stratégie de croissance 
pour l’UE. Concrètement, ce rapport propose de : 
 Clarifier la valeur ajoutée de l’action de l’UE avec ses régions. Cela passe par une clarification des objectifs de 
gouvernance économique de l’UE et du rôle de ses dépenses d’investissement (notamment la politique de cohésion) 
reposant sur la constitution de données scientifiques solides; 
 Mettre en exergue les finalités des réformes structurelles. Cela nécessite de démontrer le rôle des réformes 
structurelles dans la mise en œuvre de l’ensemble des objectifs des politiques publiques de l’Union et d’intégrer ces 
éléments dans une nouvelle stratégie de croissance et de cohésion pour l’UE ; 
 Définir les instruments permettant à la Politique de Cohésion de contribuer à la stratégie de croissance de 
l’UE. Ces mesures doivent s’appuyer sur la logique des conditions aujourd’hui associé à la distribution des Fonds 
ESI. La conditionnalité macroéconomique peut être considérée d’après une logique similaire et son statut de condition 
ex-post devrait être repositionné en condition ex-ante ; 
 Permettre une meilleure appropriation de l’agenda de gouvernance économique de l’UE par ses parties 
prenantes. Ceci peut être atteint en renforçant la participation des acteurs infranationaux dans la gouvernance 
économique de l’Union et en s’assurant que les conditions liées à l’utilisation des Fonds ESI, contribuent aux 
objectives de « cohésion économique, sociale et territoriale » de la politique de cohésion.  
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1 Introduction 
The European Union (EU) is facing all-encompassing challenges that have the potential to undermine 
the future development of the EU project. They include migration, security, rising Euroscepticism or 
the fight against climate change. Each of them carry both significant financial and political implications. 
To address these challenges, a growing number of voices call for a realignment of budget priorities at 
the European level. Ahead of the upcoming negotiations on the post-2020 Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF), some are calling for a reduction of the share of Cohesion Policy and other 
‘traditional’ policies (such as the Common Agricultural Policy) in the EU’s funding strategy. 
Furthermore, 27 member states need to prepare for the implications of Brexit on the EU budget in a 
context of heightened pressure for fiscal consolidation.1 
Cohesion Policy currently comprises 34% of EU expenditure. As underscored in the European 
Commission’s 2017 reflection paper on the future of EU finances,2 Cohesion Policy – its objectives, 
conditionalities and budget allocation – will therefore be the subject of much debate. 
Today, there is an emergent consensus that Cohesion Policy after 2020 must reform to respond to 
new demands and challenges. There is no agreement, however, on the nature of the changes to be 
made. Wide-ranging proposals are emerging concerning the reform of the European Structural and 
Investment (ESI) Funds to better support the implementation of Cohesion Policy objectives. Proposals 
include introducing stronger linkages between the rules governing the allocation of funds and the 
achievement of existing and additional EU objectives, such as economic convergence, macroeconomic 
stability, social inclusion, employment, skills, innovation, climate change, energy, and environmental 
transition.3 CP is also known as one of the Union’s most visible policy. It serves as a key vehicle of 
European solidarity. Cohesion Policy is hence seen as a possible vehicle for championing European 
values, such as subsidiarity, the integration of migrants, the respect to the rule of law and the 
safeguarding of fundamental values.  
In this context, there is growing concern across the community in charge of implementing CP 
(thereafter referred to as the ‘CP community’) that CP reform could lead to even more responsibilities 
to shoulder. Concerns about ‘policy overload’ and ‘policy dilution’ are exacerbated by the difficulty 
of local and regional players to keep track of all the priorities to be met in the name of Cohesion Policy.4  
A critical item of the debate on the future of CP is the proposal to strengthen the link between the 
ESI Funds and economic governance objectives agreed during the euro area crisis. The crisis revealed 
how the negative spill-over effects of fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances of some EU countries could 
affect the resilience of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). To prevent the spill-over effects and 
correct the imbalances, member states adopted a set of measures referred to as an ‘enhanced 
economic governance system’. 
Among them, new pre-conditions for the 2014-2020 CP on the disbursement of ESI Funds (referred 
to as “conditionalities”) were agreed. They include macroeconomic conditionality (MEC) and ex-ante 
conditionalities (ExAC). ExAC enable the Commission to condition the disbursement of CP funds on the 
adoption of sound and specific action plans from member states and regions to prevent fiscal and 
                                               
1 Chomicz, Ewa (2017), "EU budget post-Brexit: confronting reality, exploring viable solutions", EPC Discussion Paper, European Policy 
Centre (EPC), Brussels. 
2 European Commission (2017), “Reflection Paper on the Future of EU Finances”, Brussels. 
3 Ibid.  
4 European Parliament (2017), “Building Blocks for a Future Cohesion Policy – First Reflections”, Brussels. 
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macroeconomic imbalances. The MEC mechanism entitles the Commission to reprogramme or 
suspend the disbursement of ESI Funds when macroeconomic imbalances need to be corrected. 
The rationale for these reforms is two-fold: first, the new conditionalities on ESI funds were developed 
to incentivise countries to conduct the reforms deemed necessary to prevent negative cross-border 
externalities. Second, the new pre-conditions are set to ensure the effective implementation of ESI 
Funds – and their contribution to the EU’s economic growth and investment objectives. By 
incentivising member states to maintain a sound economic environment, the new conditionalities 
should help spur a favourable climate for private and public investment. 
In this study, we look at the scope for strengthening the link between Cohesion Policy and the EU’s 
economic governance objectives in the context of the next Multiannual Financial Framework. We 
draw upon data gathered in the framework of the EPC workshop held on the 31 May 2017, desk 
research and a series of semi-structured interviews. 
We first describe the genesis of Cohesion Policy and its progressive alignment with the goals of the 
Europe 2020 strategy. We then explore how the provisions introduced in the wake of the financial and 
economic crisis have further conditioned the access to EU funding to the fulfilment of new objectives 
linked to, for example, the macroeconomic environment and/or the governance capacity of the 
beneficiaries (section 2). 
We then analyse the rationale for linking ESI Funds to the fulfilment of EU economic governance 
objectives and the implementation of structural reforms (SR). We also assess the effectiveness of new 
pre-conditions associated to the use of ESI Funds in delivering on intended outcomes (section 3). 
We also present how CP stakeholders perceive these provisions. For this, we focus in this paper on the 
so-called Cohesion Policy community, i.e. the managing authorities, regional and local players who 
are responsible for CP management and delivery. We assess the scope for increasing the link between 
the use of ESI Funds and the fulfilment of EU’s economic governance objectives (section 4). 
We then propose a set of strategic and concrete recommendations as to how Cohesion Policy could 
be amended to strengthen its coherence with the EU’s economic governance objectives (section 5).  
Finally, we draw our concluding remarks (section 6). 
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2 A retrospective: The evolution of ESI Funds 
In this section, we review the initial objectives of the European structural and investment funds since 
their creation in the late 1980s and early 1990s. We then describe their incremental alignment with 
the two inter-related objectives of EU economic governance: preserving a stable macroeconomic 
environment and fostering growth and competitiveness. 
2.1 The origins of Cohesion Policy 
Cohesion Policy (CP) is the main instrument enabling the European Union to strengthen its “economic, 
social and territorial cohesion.”5 CP was introduced to counterbalance the negative externalities 
associated with single market integration. From the outset, Cohesion Policy entailed an important 
solidarity dimension. In the current programming period (2014-20), member states agreed that the 
main purpose of CP should be to help “reduce disparities between the levels of development of the 
EU's various regions by promoting economic growth, job creation and competitiveness.”6 
With EUR 351.8 billion set aside for the 2014-2020 programming period –a third of the EU budget – 
Cohesion Policy is also considered the Union’s primary investment tool. Following a continuous increase 
of the share of the structural funds in the EU budget over successive programming periods, this trend 
has stalled in recent periods. This abatement reflected the budget constraints imposed by member states 
coupled with apparent concerns about the effectiveness of EU structural funds. In a move to rationalise 
the diverse use of EU funds, the EU structural funds were grouped under the heading of ‘European 
Structural and Investment Funds’ (ESIF) in the 2014-2020 programming period. They were also integrated 
under a common investment strategy,7 called the Common Strategic Framework (CSF).  
Cohesion Policy also serves a communication purpose. Through the funding of concrete projects, the 
EU intends to showcase its added value ‘on the ground’. In the eyes of EU citizens, Cohesion Policy 
should serve as the ‘face of the Union’.8 Funds are granted based on Partnership Agreements (PAs) 
between the EU and member states and are implemented through Operational Programmes (OPs) by 
member states or regions. Accordingly, the solidarity, investment and communication purposes of 
Cohesion Policy are tied to thorough scrutiny regarding the spending priorities, the accountability and 
the benefits of the policy. 
2.2 Alignment with the Europe 2020 strategy 
In 2010, the Union adopted the Europe 2020 strategy, a growth strategy for the ensuing decade. The 
overarching goal was to make the EU a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy. These three mutually 
reinforcing priorities were intended to help the EU and its members reach high levels of employment, 
                                               
5 Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
6 Council of the European Union (2013), “Council adopts cohesion policy package for 2014-2020”, Press release, Brussels. 
7 Jointly managed by the European Commission and the EU countries, ESIF includes: (i) European regional development fund (ERDF), which 
promotes balanced development in the different regions of the EU; (ii) European social fund (ESF), which supports employment-related 
projects and invests in Europe’s human capital; (iii) Cohesion Fund (CF),which funds transport and environment projects in countries where 
the gross national income (GNI) per inhabitant is less than 90% of the EU average; (iv) European agricultural fund for rural development 
(EAFRD), which focuses on particular challenges facing EU’s rural areas; and (v) European maritime and fisheries fund (EMFF), which helps 
coastal communities adopt sustainable practices and diversify their economies. 
8 A recent Eurobarometer indicated that over a third of respondents – and above half of those based in net beneficiary member states of 
the Policy – had heard of EU co-financed projects. See European Commission (2017), “Citizens’ awareness and perceptions of EU regional 
policy”, Flash Eurobarometer 452, report, Brussels. 
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productivity and cohesion. Concretely, the Union set ambitious objectives in five areas – employment, 
innovation, education, social inclusion and climate/energy – to be reached by 2020.9  
The Common Strategic Framework translates the objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy into workable 
actions to be supported by the ESI Funds. For the 2014-2020 programming period, eleven thematic 
objectives10 were developed in line with the five objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy. These mores 
specific objectives were conceived to help regions and member states propose concrete projects that 
were consistent with the overall priorities of the strategy.  
This constituted a first attempt to align the strategy (Europe 2020) and the tools (ESIF) of the 
European Union’s economic policy. 
2.3 Contribution to macroeconomic surveillance 
2.3.1 EU economic governance framework 
In the wake of the financial and economic crisis, the EU’s focus on achieving the objectives set out by 
the Europe 2020 Growth Strategy was gradually supplemented by the imperative to strengthen the 
rules governing macroeconomic surveillance in the EMU.  
As a result, new, additional objectives were attributed to the distribution of ESI Funds. 
In 2010, to strengthen the monitoring of fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances observed in the EMU, 
the European Semester process was introduced. According to this new framework, each member state 
must present annually to the European Commission its National Reform Programme (NRP) and a three-
year budget plan.11 Each programme details the specific policies each country will implement to pursue 
its growth objectives and prevent macroeconomic imbalances. Countries must also present concrete 
plans to comply with the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact and the Country Specific 
Recommendations (CSRs) formulated by the Commission in the NRPs. 
With the adoption of the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) in December 2013, the allocation of the 
ESI Funds was further aligned with the EU’s economic governance objectives.12 The aim was to push 
for the implementation of structural reforms to foster a sound macroeconomic and fiscal environment 
in each member state.  
  
                                               
9 These objectives include: (1) 75% of the 20-64 year olds to be employed; (2) 3% of the EU’s GDP to be invested in R&D; (3) addressing 
climate change and energy sustainability while aiming to diminish greenhouse gas emissions by 20%, increasing the share of renewables as 
well as energy efficiency to 20%; (4) investing in education while bringing the rates of early school leaving below 10% and having at least 
40% of 30-34 year olds completing third level education; (5) fighting poverty and social exclusion while lifting at least 20 million people out 
of risk of poverty or social exclusion. Most member state have adopted their own national targets in each of these areas. 
10 The eleven objectives are: (1) strengthening research, technological development and innovation; (2) enhancing access to, and use and 
quality of, ICT; (3) enhancing the competitiveness of SMEs, of the agricultural sector (for the EAFRD) and of the fishery and aquaculture 
sector (for the EMFF); (4) supporting the shift towards a low-carbon economy in all sectors; (5) promoting climate change adaptation, risk 
prevention and management; (6) preserving and protecting the environment and promoting resource efficiency; (7) promoting 
sustainable transport and removing bottlenecks in key network infrastructures; (8) promoting sustainable and quality employment and 
supporting labour mobility; (9) promoting social inclusion, combating poverty and any discrimination; (10) investing in education, training 
and vocational training for skills and lifelong learning; (11) enhancing institutional capacity of public authorities and stakeholders and 
efficient public administration. 
11 The National Reform Programme is called Stability (for euro area countries) or Convergence (for non-euro area countries) Programme. 
12 Common Provisions Regulations 
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The link between ESI Funds and the EU’s economic governance objective was strengthened through 
the introduction of new procedures. Today, the five ESI Funds13 are linked to economic governance 
procedures – including CSRs, relevant Council recommendations, or memoranda of understanding (in 
the case of member states under financial assistance). In addition, the CPR equipped the European 
Commission with additional instruments, including (i) a set of ex-ante conditionalities and (ii) a 
strengthened macroeconomic conditionality.  
2.3.2 Ex-ante conditionalities 
Broadly speaking, the ex-ante conditionalities on ESI Funds14 can be viewed as incentive mechanisms 
to ensure that the necessary conditions for the effective and efficient use of ESI Funds are in place. The 
ex-ante conditionalities are based on the CSRs and several thematic objectives set in the context of the 
2014-2020 programming period. It also follows the logic that in lower income regions and countries, 
EU support to investment has to produce not only higher growth rates but also a ‘transformative 
effect’, i.e. signs of development that will facilitate growth with less external support at a later stage.15  
Accordingly, the use of ExAC covers a wide structural reform agenda16 which notably focuses on three 
types of conditions linked to:  
 policy and strategic frameworks to ensure that the strategic documents at national and regional 
level which underpin ESI Funds investments are of high quality and in line with standards 
commonly agreed by member states at EU level; 
 regulatory frameworks to ensure that implementation of operations co-financed by ESI Funds 
complies with the EU acquis; 
 institutional and administrative capacity to guarantee the sound management of the Funds.17  
 
The European Commission was also entitled with the right to introduce reprogramming requests in 
case a country fails to implement the CSRs and/or thematic objectives set out in programmes. 
                                               
13 The European structural and investment funds were initially created to fulfil specific purposes: 
• the European regional development fund (ERDF) promotes a balance development of all European regions of the EU; 
• the European social fund (ESF) supports employment-related projects and invests in Europe’s human capital; 
• the Cohesion Fund (CF) supports transport and environment projects in countries where the gross national income per inhabitant is less 
than 90% of the EU average; 
• the European agricultural fund for rural development (EAFRD) focuses on challenges facing EU’s rural areas; 
• the European maritime and fisheries fund (EMFF) helps coastal communities adopt sustainable practices and diversify their economies. 
14 There are currently 48 ExAC established in the legislative framework of the ESI Funds. This notably includes: 
• 7 ‘general ExAC’ are linked to horizontal aspects of programme implementation and are applicable to all ESI Funds; 
• 29 ‘thematic ExAC’ set sector-specific conditions for investment co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the 
European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF); 
• 12 ‘fund-specific ExAC’ are directly linked to a fund in particular: 8 are linked to the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(EAFRD) and 4 to the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMF). 
An overview of the content of ExAC is provided in Annex 1 of European Commission (2017), “The Value Added of Ex ante Conditionalities 
in the European Structural and Investment Funds”, Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels. 
15 Andor, László (2017), “Cohesion and Conditionality in the EU”, Progressive Economy blog, 
http://www.progressiveeconomy.eu/sites/default/files/LA-cohesion-final.pdf  
16 European Commission (2017), “The Value Added of Ex ante Conditionalities”. 
17 Hamza C, Jeffrey P, Vincze M and Wihlborg M (2016), “The implementation of the provisions in relation to the ex-ante conditionalities 
during the programming phase of the European Structural and Investment (ESI) Funds”, Final report to the European Commission (DG 
REGIO), Metis with ICF International, Vienna. 
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2.3.3 Macroeconomic conditionality 
The mechanism of macroeconomic conditionality is composed of two strands. The preventive and the 
corrective arm18 serve different purposes: 
 On the one hand, the ‘preventive arm’ of MEC allows the Commission to request a member state 
to re-programme part of its funding when this is deemed necessary to maximise the “growth and 
competitiveness impact” of the Funds. It also gives the possibility to the Commission to consider 
a suspension of payments when member states fail to address its reprogramming request.19  
 On the other hand, the ‘corrective arm’ of MEC requests the Commission to propose a suspension 
of funding when it is deemed necessary to correct imbalances identified in the context of EU 
economic governance procedures. This includes the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), the 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) as well as other macro-economic adjustment 
programmes. 
***************************************** 
ESI Funds have been subject to an increasing number of objectives over time. Beyond the objectives 
of economic, social and territorial cohesion set out in the Treaties, the Funds have been linked to 
Cohesion Policy’s eleven thematic objectives and to the Europe 2020 strategy. More recently, the 
financial and economic crisis has led to an increasing focus on the role that ESI Funds should play in 
helping to safeguard a sound macroeconomic environment for the EMU. 
It is the connection between the two, inter-connected aims of growth and stability, which has given 
rise to the assumption that ESI Funds can and should be further integrated in the enhanced economic 
governance system developed during the euro area crisis. 
However, as alluded to in the introduction, the increasing number of objectives associated to the use 
of ESI Funds has created a feeling of ‘policy overload’ or ‘policy dilution’ among the CP community, 
notably with regard to its ability to pursue its solidarity function. Our consultations reveal that this 
evolution has made the management and monitoring of Cohesion Policy ever more complicated. This 
also contrasts with the Commission’s simplification agenda for the 2014-2020 MFF.20 
Against that background, the next section draws a first assessment of the effectiveness of the ex-ante 
and macroeconomic conditionalities in delivering on the two above-mentioned objectives and at what 
role the concerns of the CP community have played in the implementation of this agenda. 
                                               
18 European Parliament (2014), ‘The European Structural and Investment Funds and sound economic governance: guidelines for the 
implementation of Article 23 of the Common Provisions 
Regulation”, Briefing, Brussels. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/529088/IPOL_BRI(2014)529088_EN.pdf  
19 European Commission (2014), “Guidelines on the application of the measures linking effectiveness of the European Structural and 
Investment Funds to sound economic governance according to Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 1303/2013”, Brussels. 
20 European Commission (2012), "A simplification agenda for the 2014-2020 MFF", Brussels, 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/news/article_en.cfm?id=201202080936  
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3 The impact of conditionalities on ESI Funds 
In this section, we attempt to review the extent to which the introduction of (i) ex-ante conditionalities 
and (ii) macroeconomic conditionality has helped achieve the two aims identified in the previous 
section: (i) fostering growth and investment; and (ii) reducing fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances.  
The contribution of ESI Funds to the EU’s economic governance objectives is a sweeping issue that 
could be explored in several different ways and through a variety of analytical tools. Two caveats also 
that prevent us from addressing this issue in more depth: 
 Hindsight: First, we do not have enough hindsight. The Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) on 
ESI Funds was adopted in December 2013. It is too early to report conclusively on the role and 
merits of making ESI Funds conditional on structural reforms and macroeconomic performance, 
whose effects usually manifest themselves in the medium to long-term. 
 Segmentation: Growth and macroeconomic stability are complex processes that build on many 
factors beyond the role of ESI Funds. Other factors, such as framework conditions or alternative 
sources of public and private investment, can play an important role in achieving these objectives. 
Distinguishing and quantifying the net contribution of each factor to single that of ESIF 
conditionalities is a task beyond the scope of this paper. 
Against this backdrop, this section focuses on highlighting some emerging findings available to date 
about the role that conditionality on structural reforms and macroeconomic criteria has played in 
strengthening the contribution of ESI Funds to the EU’s economic governance objectives. 
Given the imminent start of the negotiations on the post-2020 funding strategy, this section draws 
attention to the political economy of these reforms by looking both at the position of net contributors 
to the EU budget among member states and at the views of the wider CP community. 
3.1 Ex-ante conditionality 
We assess below the role played by two ExAC in setting incentives for the enactment of a sound 
business environment. Given the limited scope of this paper, we concentrate on the role played by 
ExAC in creating an impetus to deliver the implementation of reforms linked to two objectives: 
investing in growth-oriented innovation; and building administrative capacity. 
3.1.1 Investing in growth-oriented innovation 
As part of its ‘Europe 2020’ strategy, the EU has been encouraging regions to develop Smart 
Specialisation Strategies (S3) since the beginning of this programming period. The aim is to direct their 
investment efforts towards growth-oriented innovation. As such, it appears as “a valuable tool to 
tackle the innovation gap, and boost jobs and growth in Europe.”21 
Introduced as an ex-ante conditionality in the 2014-2020 programming period of Cohesion Policy, the 
development of smart specialisation strategies is currently a prerequisite to receive funding from the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). 
Linking the development of S3 to the allocation of ERDF funding has improved the quality of the 
implementation of these strategies across Europe. According to a 2017 study on the value of ExAC in 
                                               
21 European Parliament (2016), “Report on Cohesion Policy and Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialisation” (RIS3), Brussels, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2F%2FEP%2F%2FTEXT%2BREPORT%2BA8-2016-
0159%2B0%2BDOC%2BXML%2BV0%2F%2FEN&language=LT 
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the ESIF,22 the Commission sets out several concrete examples where ExAC is said to have incentivised 
the implementation of S3: In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany), the ExAC gave the region an 
impetus to increase the involvement of relevant stakeholders in its existing innovation strategy. ExACs 
also allegedly helped improve the mechanisms for monitoring technological development and 
innovation as well as investments in research in Italy, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands and Poland. 
Other studies show that S3 has also helped boost the effectiveness of the ESI Funds in a more structural 
way. A recent Staff Working Document by the European Commission provides evidence that S3 has 
positively impacted “ the governance and […] the behaviour of the stakeholders in the innovation 
systems.”23 The European Parliament noted that S3 have helped prioritise investments supported by 
the ESIF.24 Although results are unequal across the EU’s territories, it shows that conditionalities on 
the allocation of ESI Funds can impact positively both the EU’s economic governance objectives and 
the effectiveness of EU funds. 
These developments indicate that EU requirements (or conditions) can be received positively when 
these take the form of a more ‘transformative’ effect. Equally, the ‘formative’ approach pursued by 
ExAC in policies such as S3 could also be seen as a way to support the CP’s mandate of fostering 
economic and social convergence across the continent.  
Acknowledging that the policy is still in its infancy, any further developments should continue to build 
evidence concerning how S3 is incentivising reform of regional and national research and innovation 
systems. However, to also fully champion CP’s objective of reducing disparities between regions, the 
Policy should also consider the territorial impact assessment of strategies such as S3 – notably 
regarding the agglomeration rationale that it allegedly favours.25  
3.1.2 Building administrative capacity 
Administrative and institutional shortfalls are often identified as a major obstacle to the delivery of 
structural reforms in countries, especially those struggling with the consequences of the economic 
crisis.26 
Nevertheless, evidence on the effectiveness of ex-ante conditionality in supporting the 
modernisation of public administration remains mixed. An EPC case study found that the level of 
policy changes triggered by the ESI Funds is rather low.27 
On the other hand, evidence from some EU countries suggests that ex-ante conditionalities (ExAC) on 
ESI Funds can incentivise public administration reform.28 Examples include building the policy-making 
capacity of civil servants or boosting the development of government information systems in Estonia. 
In Portugal, the ExAC on “institutional capacity and efficient public administration” seems to have 
played a role in the design of a new vocational training system as part of the government plan to 
modernise its public administration.29 According to the Commission, ex-ante conditionalities have also 
                                               
22 European Commission (2017), “The Value Added of Ex ante Conditionalities in the European Structural and Investment Funds”. 
23 European Commission (2017), “Strengthening Innovation in Europe’s Regions: Towards resilient, inclusive and sustainable growth at 
territorial level”, Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017SC0264&from=EN  
24 Ibid.  
25 See Hunter, Alison (2017), “Smart Specialisation: championing the EU’s economic growth and investment agenda?”, EPC Commentary, 
European Policy Centre, Brussels. http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?cat_id=4&pub_id=7861. It could also be argued that this effect 
could run against the original CP objective of counterbalancing the negative externalities associated with single market integration. 
26 European Parliament (2016), “Public Sector Reform: How the EU budget is used to encourage it”, Brussels: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/572696/IPOL_STU(2016)572696_EN.pdf  
27 Ibid.  
28 European Commission (2017), “The Value Added”. 
29 Ibid. 
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encouraged a stronger self-assessment component in the financial management of CP programmes by 
member states and regions.  
The Council acknowledged the transformative effect of ex-ante conditionalities when it mentioned 
them as a positive “facilitator”30 in the planning and set-up of structures supporting the 
implementation of Cohesion Policy. This shows that ex-ante conditionalities can incentivise member 
states and regions in conducting structural and growth-enhancing reforms, such as those identified in 
the CSRs. 
Moving forward, the priority is to gather further evidence on the nature and size of the interactions 
between ExAC conditionality and the strengthening of administrative capacity. More specifically, there 
is a need to better understand the trade-offs at stake and to compare the costs of the measures in 
terms of financial and human resources against the benefits achieved. In addition, there is a need for 
the EU to ensure that its support fully considers of the uneven playing field which exists between EU 
regions regarding administrative capacity. In the absence of a tailored approach,31 there is indeed a 
risk that ESI Funds would be drifted away from the regions which need it the most.  
***************************************** 
This section has shown that ExAC can help the EU deliver on its structural and growth-enhancing reform 
agenda. Through ExAC, ESI Funds can represent an incentive to improve the investment environment 
across the EU. The transformative approach of ExAC can also play a positive role in fostering public 
administrations reforms and hence help boost the capabilities of some EU regions and countries.  
These developments confirm emerging findings about the positive role played by ExAC on the 
implementation of Country Specific Recommendations32 and first assessments that “had it not been 
for ExAC, reforms and changes might not have happened or they might have happened at a much 
slower pace.” 33  
However, our findings also confirm the Commission’s view that “a lasting positive effect of these 
achievements depends on the ownership by the Member States and regions in carrying out the 
changes kick-started by the ExAc.”  
Ownership of the EU’s economic objectives is a major issue that may determine the success of the 
conditionality agenda. This is also evident in the implementation of the macroeconomic conditionality 
(MEC). 
3.2 Macroeconomic conditionality 
As previous sections have shown, there is much debate as to what is and what should be the exact 
purpose of MEC in (i) fostering growth and investment and (ii) incentivising member states to reduce 
fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances. This section looks at the role that MEC has played in delivering 
on its objectives of (i) enhancing macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance; and (ii) improving the 
investment environment. 
                                               
30 Council of the European Union (2016), “Conclusions on results and new elements of cohesion policy and the European structural 
investment funds”, Brussels. 
31 Barca, Fabrizio (2017) The European Union’s Great Opportunity. Keynote speech at the 7th Cohesion Forum (EU cohesionpolicy, a 
forward-looking perspective), 26-27 June, Brussels, http://www.fabriziobarca.it/Files/Barca-Bruxelles-27-giugno.pdf  
32 A a useful review of the support of the ESI Funds to the implementation of CSRs and to structural reforms in Member States is provided 
in European Commission (2016), “The implementation of the provisions in relation to the ex-ante conditionalities during the programming 
phase of the European Structural and Investment (ESI) Funds”, Brussels, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/policy/how/studies_integration/impl_exante_esif_report_en.pdf  
33 European Commission (2017), “The Value Added”. 
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3.2.1 Enhancing macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance 
In the wake of the financial crisis, there has been an increasing recognition that, in the absence of a 
genuine budgetary capacity for the euro area, EU countries may be vulnerable to the negative cross-
border spill-over effects of fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances arising in other member states. In 
this context, there have been heightened demands for ESI Funds to play a stronger role in the EU’s 
enhanced fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance framework. 
Some economic conditionality was applied to Cohesion Policy prior in the 2007-2013 programming 
period. Yet, although macroeconomic conditionality already applied to the Cohesion Fund, it had never 
been used in practice until 2012, and there were no ex-ante conditionalities. Introducing such  
pre-conditions was seen by the Commission as a way to ensure that the impact of ESI Funds is not 
undermined by unsound economic policies or institutions.34 By providing incentives for member 
states to reduce fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances, the ‘preventive arm’ of MEC strengthens  
the link between ESI Funds and the economic governance objectives agreed in the context of the 
European Semester.  
With the ‘corrective arm’ of MEC, the Commission has also a de facto sanction mechanism to prevent 
the emergence of imbalances that could affect the resilience of the euro area. In the EMU context, 
structural reforms include those measures that help prevent negative cross-border spill-overs. In this 
regard, the German government has recently stressed that ESI Funds should serve as a “lever for 
necessary structural reforms and compliance” with the macroeconomic surveillance framework. It 
also called for MEC to be “retained and developed further” in the next MFF with a view to a “more 
stringent application.”35 This approach suggests that MEC should help foster the implementation of 
reforms with a fiscal consolidation objective. 
Our consultations have revealed diverging views on the effectiveness of MEC in encouraging member 
states to correct macroeconomic imbalances. Whereas some interviewees noted that the prospect of 
a suspension of EU funds may have played a role in pushing Spain and Portugal to correct their 
macroeconomic imbalances, others have argued that the decision of the Council not to effectively 
suspend ESI Funds had a negative impact on the credibility of the mechanism. This, in turn, was said 
to reduce the incentive for other member states to reduce their own imbalances. 
Discussions held in the context of the EPC workshop have emphasised that MEC could in fact be 
counter-productive in going against its declared objective of reducing macroeconomic imbalances. 
Some participants have argued that sanctions could have a pro-cyclical impact by reducing the 
investment capacity of member states in economic downturns. Evidence suggests that the ‘punitive’ 
dimension may have discouraged government spending on productive investments for fear that 
increased public spending would lead to sanctions.36 This is also true for local and regional 
administrations (LRAs) where MEC has put additional pressure towards fiscal consolidation at a time 
when increased spending could arguably have helped alleviate the social and economic restrictions 
during the financial crisis.37 
                                               
34 European Commission (2015), “The impact of the economic and financial crisis on the reform of Cohesion Policy 2008-2013”, Regional 
Working Paper 2015, Brussels, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/work/2015_03_impact_crisis.pdf  
35 On 20 June 2017, the German government and the German Länder published a “Joint Statement on EU Cohesion Policy after 2020” 
highlighting a set of common priorities for the future of CP in the next MFF, but also some diverging views (such as on the role of 
macroeconomic conditionality). For more information, see the The Federal Government of the Republic of Germany, (2017). 
36 Evidence suggests that countries the most affected by the sovereign debt crisis saw the share of ‘productive investment’ decline over 
the course of the crisis. See Haas, Joerg and Huguenot-Noël, Robin (2017), “Are the spending priorities of the Euro Area converging?”, 
Jacques Delors Institute – Berlin, Berlin.  
37 Jouen, Marjorie (2015), “The macroeconomic conditionality, the story of a triple penalty for region”, Jacques Delors Institute, Paris. 
  
17 
 
To sum up, there is currently an absence of conclusive evidence regarding what MEC has achieved in 
practice. There is no consensus on its rationale or its effectiveness in enhancing macroeconomic and 
fiscal surveillance. There are thus doubts about the ability of the MEC’s ‘corrective arm’ to help deliver 
on structural reforms. There may also be a conflict with the objectives followed under its ‘preventive 
arm’ of improving the investment environment. 
3.2.2 Improving the investment environment 
The introduction of MEC also followed another, albeit complementary, logic. In the name of greater 
EU cohesion and to respond to significant macroeconomic imbalances, there has been increasing 
support in the EU for focusing on growth-enhancing reforms, especially in those regions where growth 
has stalled. At the same time, there is a general acknowledgement that ESI Funds should be more 
effective and that framework conditions can play an important role in this regard. 
The MEC notably aims to incentivise member states to adopt the reforms required to boost 
productivity or savings, thereby increasing both the effectiveness and efficiency of a country’s 
investment, and hence its potential growth. It is indeed widely acknowledged that a sound 
macroeconomic environment can foster economies of scale, the leverage effect, and thus lead to 
further positive spill-over effects on investment. A favourable business climate is often a pre-condition 
for public investments, such as ESIF, to reap social and economic benefits. 
At this stage, there is however scarce evidence about how effective MEC has been in incentivising 
member states to improve their business and investment environment. 
Preliminary findings indicate that the ‘corrective arm’ of MEC and the prospect of sanctions may have 
negatively affected the investment environment. Many local and regional authorities (LRAs) consider 
that MEC has created a less stable environment for local and regional investment.38 Although the 
provisions linked to the ‘corrective arm’ of MEC have not yet been implemented, it could also be 
argued that a mechanism that can pressure member states / LRAs to reduce investment is in fact 
detrimental to the implementation of structural reforms. Furthermore, there can be a compounding 
effect since the negative impact on investment is more likely to occur in economies which have less 
fiscal capacity. 
Moving beyond this issue, it may be argued the lack of evidence, to date, regarding the relationship 
between MEC and structural reforms is also due to an insufficient alignment between ESI Funds and 
the EU’s enhanced macroeconomic governance framework. Stakeholders39 pointed to a timing 
mismatch between the European Semester and CSRs – which look at yearly processes – and the 
medium and long-term programme planning strategy required for the ESIFs. Participants at the EPC 
workshop also stressed that while EU economic governance instruments look at yearly processes, 
large-scale investments usually take years to produce results. As a result, MEC could possibly affect 
projects in the ‘pipeline’ due to this timing mismatch.  
  
                                               
38 According to a study published by the Committee of the Regions,   57% of the LRAs consider that the enforcement of the 
macroeconomic conditionality creates a “high-risk situation” for the co-funding of programmes, while 32% consider it to be a “moderate 
risk”. See Committee of the Regions (2014), “CoR online consultation on public investments, growth and the national co-financing of ESIF”, 
Brussels. 
39 The Federal Government of the Republic of Germany (2017), “Joint statement by the German government and German Länder on EU 
Cohesion Policy beyond 2020”, Berlin. 
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Moving forward, there is a need to understand how MEC could be used as a positive incentive to foster 
growth-enhancing reforms based on an ‘invest to save’ narrative. However, several questions remain 
unanswered regarding how such incentives could work in practice, including on the provision of the 
funds, the nature and the value of structural reforms as well as the timing and the accountability of 
their implementation.  
***************************************** 
This section showed that ex-ante conditionalities, overall, can help enable reforms. There is thus a 
tendency to view them positively. Our consultations suggest that they have played a constructive role 
in supporting member states and regions to build robust regulatory and capacity foundations and 
deliver key CP objectives. Moving forward, CP should build upon the positive experience of ExAC to 
bring back the transformational dimension of the Funds at the top of the EU’s investment agenda.40 
This positive assessment should, however, be balanced with concerns that any greater role foreseen for 
ExAC should be considered in the context of applying these in a proportional way, linked to both capacity 
and need. This means that any developments should also consider how ExAC could better consider the 
new geographical divides – created by new global trends affecting EU territories differently – in 
determining how to ensure a sound implementation of ESIF in EU countries and regions.41   
At this stage, it remains difficult to provide conclusive evidence about the role of the macroeconomic 
conditionality (MEC) in reducing imbalances and boosting growth and investment. Some stakeholders 
have argued that MEC could have had a counterproductive impact on both intended outcomes. Given 
this scepticism, we recommended that any continuation or strengthening of the MEC’s role be 
supported by a compelling evidence about its contribution to wider growth objectives in member 
states and regions. More specifically, one should focus on gathering evidence on whether MEC has 
been effective in fostering national structural reform agendas, in spurring growth, in facilitating the 
implementation of CP objectives, or in boosting adherence to the EMU’s macroeconomic and fiscal 
stability objectives. 
Moving forward, a more comprehensive review of MEC could help build consensus in the debate on 
the reform of Cohesion Policy and the negotiations of the next multi-annual financial framework (2020-
2026). There may be merit in exploring the extent to which shifting MEC from an ex-post to an ex-ante 
conditionality as part of a wider package of ex-ante support measures could prove beneficiary. This 
option is further explored in the following sections.  
 
                                               
40 Andor, László (2017), “Cohesion and Conditionality in the EU” 
41 Dhéret, Claire (2017), “Achieving social triple A: What role for EU cohesion policy?”, EPC Policy Brief, European Policy Centre (EPC), 
Brussels, http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_7715_achievingsta.pdf  
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4 A prospective outlook: The challenges ahead 
Building upon the findings of the previous sections and the interviews conducted in the framework of 
this study, we assess in this section the challenges that could arise in setting more structural reform 
and macroeconomic conditionalities in the management of ESI funds and Cohesion Policy. 
We have identified three main challenges: (i) the need to clarify the rationale for structural reforms 
based on evidence of its role in boosting the effectiveness of ESI Funds; (ii) the need to ensure 
coherence and consistency between the stability objectives pursued by the EU’s economic governance 
system and the growth objectives pursued by Cohesion Policy; (iii) the need to address a set of political 
economy constraints associated with some conditionalities that can limit the anticipated impact of ESI 
Funds on boosting the impetus for structural reforms and macroeconomic stability. 
4.1 A clearer case for structural reforms 
According to the Common Provision Regulations, conditionalities are intended as a tool to strengthen 
the link between ESI Funds, structural reforms and economic governance objectives. Yet, the CPR does 
not define the kind of structural reforms which ExAC and MEC are aiming at. Also, the definition of 
what constitutes ‘structural reforms’ may differ by country and region. The below findings indicate 
how the lack of clarity about the purpose of structural reforms has created confusion about its purpose 
in the Cohesion Policy context. 
4.1.1 Is structural reforms part of the CP mandate?  
Since the beginning of the 2014-2020 programming period, the EU has taken several measures to 
further link the use of ESI Funds to the implementation of structural reforms. The EU has set up a three-
year Structural Reform Service Programme (SRSP) that has started in 2017. The SRSP enables the 
Commission to use ESI Funds to support the implementation of structural reforms at the request of a 
member state.42 
Several policy documents have emphasised the priority given to structural reforms. Since 2016, we 
can list the Annual Growth Survey (AGS), the March 2016 Council conclusions,43 as well as various CSR 
reports. Furthermore, the final legal framework of 2014-2020 ESI Funds introduced a legal requirement 
to conduct the reforms deemed necessary to address country-specific recommendations (CSR) in the 
partnership agreements and operational programmes.   
However, in the context of growing concerns that the current CP has been subjected to ‘policy 
overload’, the focus on structural reforms has in fact been considered by many among the CP 
community as an additional set of secondary objectives or at least not a central CP feature. Our 
consultations indeed indicate that some interviewees even challenged the fact that CP had an 
underpinning imperative to address EU structural reforms. 
As a result, the structural reform agenda was not considered a central CP feature to many in the  
CP community. Beyond the 2020 period, this implies a strong need for much greater clarity on both 
the structural reforms to be promoted using ESI Funds and their likely impact on the effectiveness of 
ESI Funds. 
                                               
42 European Commission, Press release “Political agreement reached on Structural Reform Support Programme – a new tool to help 
Member States implement reforms”, 08.02.2017. 
43 Council of the European Union (2016), “Council conclusions on in-depth reviews and implementation of the 2015 Country Specific 
Recommendations”, Brussels. 
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4.1.2 Structural reforms: in which policy areas? 
The confusion about structural reforms also stems from the lack of clarity about the nature of 
structural reforms that ESIF should target in the CP context. The Common Provision Regulations do not 
clearly spell out the kind of structural reforms that should be made conditional on the disbursement 
of ESI funds. 
A debate has thus emerged as to which reforms should be promoted through ESI Funds. Some believe 
that conditionalities on the use of ESI Funds could become an effective incentive to push reforms linked 
to EU objectives in other policy areas, such as pension, taxation, judicial or banking sector reform in 
the member states. 
Others argue that pre-conditions should foster the implementation of reforms in policy areas that 
would help achieve the CP objectives, namely the eleven ‘thematic objectives’. This includes objectives 
such as boosting energy efficiency, digital connectivity or social inclusion.  
The EPC has long argued that Cohesion Policy needs to be embedded in a broad policy direction and 
that in the context of growing social divergences across the EU, social investment should be put at the 
centre of this policy agenda.44  
In any case, there seems to be an evident need to clarify which reforms should be targeted within the 
context of pre-conditions associated to the disbursement of ESI Funds. 
4.1.3 Structural reforms: what purpose?  
Diverging views about the purpose of structural reforms also fuels confusion in the Cohesion Policy 
context. 
For most, ‘structural reforms’ are viewed as measures with a growth-enhancing potential. They should 
help deliver on CP goals such as those defined by the thematic objectives or the Country Specific 
Recommendations set in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
Following the financial and economic crisis, ‘structural reforms’ have also referred to measures aimed 
at fostering a sound macroeconomic environment. Yet, reforms that aim at alleviating economic and 
macroeconomic imbalances vary depending on the specific economic conditions of each member state 
as shown by the country-specific focus of NRPs and CSRs. 
The confusion about the purpose of structural reforms in the CP context echoes the more fundamental 
divergences among EU members about the EU’s economic governance objectives. Should the 
Commission attempt to foster economic convergence through financial instruments such as ESI Funds? 
Or should the Commission use the Funds to promote greater adherence to the EU’s macroeconomic 
surveillance framework? In the absence of clear answers to these questions, concerns have emerged 
that some of the objectives pursued by the macroeconomic surveillance framework – including the 
‘corrective arm’ of MEC – may conflict with Cohesion Policy goals. 
4.2 Conflicting objectives between MEC and Cohesion Policy 
Another challenge lies with the way the MEC mechanism is perceived by the CP stakeholders. For them, 
the MEC hinders the fulfilment of the CP’s growth and investment objectives, its solidarity ethos, as 
well as the wider CP reform agenda. 
                                               
44 Dhéret, Claire (2017), “Achieving social triple A”. 
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4.2.1 MEC and Cohesion Policy’s growth and investment objectives 
Many in the CP community do not adhere to the rationale for the MEC mechanism. The fact that MEC 
was not ‘tested out’ during the consultation phase prior to the set-up of operational programmes has 
undermined its legitimacy. It has, arguably, fed the perception that Cohesion Policy had been taken 
‘hostage’ to address wider EU macroeconomic imbalances. Some argue that the MEC’s introduction 
was the result of a victory of the “Friends of better spending” over the “Friends of cohesion” in the 
negotiations on the MFF and CP post-2013.45 In their eyes, MEC was introduced on the premise – 
shared by net contributors – that a perceived lack of effective spending should be dealt with through 
financial penalties. 
These initial divergences about purpose and legitimacy have been echoed by the divide between the 
stability and growth objectives of MEC. On the one hand, a sound macroeconomic environment can 
foster a more favourable business and investment environment, thereby enhancing the effectiveness 
of ESI Funds. Controversies, however, exist as to the extent to which measures aiming at fiscal 
consolidation can effectively lead to growth.46 Discussions during the EPC workshop have revealed that 
the EU’s attempt to reconcile fiscal consolidation and growth objectives47 in the context of MEC is still 
a point of divergence among the CP community. In this context, the perception of MEC as a fiscal 
consolidation mechanism has overshadowed the more positive growth-enhancing rationale 
traditionally associated with ESI Funds. 
4.2.2 MEC and Cohesion Policy’s solidarity mandate 
Cohesion Policy historically encompasses a strong solidarity dimension. Yet, as previous sections have 
shown, MEC has been seen as entering in contradiction with one of the most important feature of the 
ESI Funds, namely that they provide certainty and security of investment resources in low-income 
regions. This contradiction, combined with the perception of MEC as a fiscal consolidation mechanism, 
has created concerns among the CP community that MEC may have a negative in fact negatively affect 
the reduction of disparities between EU regions. 
By focusing on cyclical fluctuations rather than addressing structural gaps and discrepancies, the 
‘punitive arm’ of MEC has also been regarded as pursuing another other function than Cohesion 
Policy’s original and still standard mandate. During the EPC workshop, some explained that using MEC 
as a tool to prevent imbalances amounts to imposing an “exogenous conditionality”, i.e. a  
pre-condition linked to objectives different from those traditionally attributed to the ESI funds.48 
4.2.3 MEC and Cohesion Policy’s reform agenda 
The high level of ambition for MEC to deliver on a wide range of objectives (including the far-reaching 
challenge of reducing fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances in the EMU) is perceived by many to have 
contributed to overstating the CP’s ability to support the EU’s wider structural reform agenda. There 
are concerns that this ambition has affected the credibility of the Policy, especially regarding its ‘reach’. 
The possibility opened by the MEC mechanism to allow for reprogramming has also been seen by 
many as a step too far towards a centralisation of the delivery of the Funds. Many local and regional 
authorities feel they are losing ownership of the management of the Funds. The Committee of the 
Regions also claimed that MEC had changed the “balance of power” within Cohesion Policy by “eroding 
                                               
45 European Commission (2015), “The impact of the economic and financial crisis”. 
46 A good overview of the academic controversy surrounding this debate is provided in Rannenberg, A, C Schoder, and J Strasky (2015), 
“The macroeconomic effects of the euro area’s fiscal consolidation 2011-2013: A simulation-based approach”, Research Technical Paper 
03/RT/2015, Central Bank of Ireland, Dublin. 
47 In the wake of the financial and economic crisis European leaders regularly referred to the objective of “growth-friendly consolidation”. 
See Haas and Huguenot-Noël (2017). See also http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/enewsletter/49_120202/  
48 Andor, László (2017), “Cohesion and Conditionality in the EU”. 
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the bottom-up approach and subsidiarity principle and strengthening top-down, centrally and 
sectorally managed solutions.”49 As such, the shared management principle is increasingly viewed as 
being under attack.  
Reprogramming has also fuelled the apprehension of more red tape imposed on the CP community.50 
The European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions have recently called for removing and 
amending significantly the MEC’s “reprogramming” provisions in the Common Provision Regulations.51 
At a minimum, they argue that the mechanism should be invoked in exceptional circumstances and in 
clear pursuit of CP’s wider goals. 
Against this background, the CP community sees MEC as a challenge to some of the key enduring 
characteristics of Cohesion Policy, including simplification and subsidiarity. 
4.3 Political economy constraints 
There is also a need to evaluate the limitations in the EU’s governance framework that may constrain 
the Commission’s ability to push forward its agenda. 
4.3.1 The EU budget: A leverage to support structural reforms? 
ESIF conditionalities present key limitations that can hamper their ability to deliver on structural reforms. 
Support through ESI Funds need to be matched by national spending so that a first key limitation may 
arise when member states have limited fiscal capacity. Other constraints may arise when member 
states or regions have diverging national priorities (where, for example, structural reforms do not 
feature strongly).  
Different levels of development also provide different constraints for ESIF conditionalities. On the one 
hand, less-developed economies – with the largest potential for reform52 – may have limited resources 
(e.g. administrative capacity) to ensure a sound implementation of the Funds. On the other, for more 
developed member states and regions, ESI Funds may not represent a strong enough incentive to push 
a structural reform agenda domestically.  
The relative influence of EU policies and funding needs to be carefully considered when assessing what 
EU added value can be achieved for each member states using conditionalities. Moving forward, this 
suggests that greater consideration should be given to the kind of levers that can help the EU provide 
more targeted incentives to deliver on the EU structural reform agenda. 
4.3.2 The limits of Realpolitik 
The full implementation of the MEC mechanism is subject to political interferences. It is often 
politically difficult for member states to support sanctions in the Council as shown by the track record 
in the excessive deficit procedure. It may also prove politically sensitive for the Commission to suggest 
a suspension of funding to a member state at a time when it already struggles to achieve fiscal 
consolidation and such punitive sanctions could only make things worse. This is even more true in 
countries confronted with high levels of Euroscepticism. 
                                               
49 Bachtler, John, Oliveria Martins, Joaquim, Wostner, Peter and Zuber, Piotr (2017), “Towards Cohesion Policy 4.0 – Structural 
Transformation and Inclusive Growth”, Regional Studies Association, Brussels. 
50 Jouen, Marjorie (2015). 
51 European Parliament (2015), “How the EU budget is spent”, Briefing, Brussels. 
52 Mendez C and Bachtler J (2015), “Permanent revolution in Cohesion policy: restarting the reform debate”, European Policies Research 
Paper, No 93, European Policies Research Centre, Glasgow. 
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Previous MFF negotiations have shown that the principle of ‘fair return’ (juste retour) and the divide 
between net contributors and net beneficiaries have often prevented fair and ‘rational’ consensus to 
emerge. In fact, EU policies, such as the CP, are thus highjacked by net contributors, who believe that 
financial penalties are required to discipline members with perceived lack of effective public spending. 
Resulting internal tensions are detrimental to both EU solidarity and further decrease the likelihood of 
reaching positive consensus. This falls far short of the leadership spirit that can be expected from the 
EU project, especially in a challenging global environment. 
***************************************** 
In a nutshell, the pilling up of different – if not diverging – objectives has blurred the rationale and the 
primary goal of structural reforms and the scope for increasing the relationship between ESI Funds 
and economic governance. Furthermore, the extension of economic governance objectives to the  
CP area may hamper the CP’s ability to deliver on its initial objectives, namely long-term growth  
and investment. 
Criticism has so far predominantly focused on two aspects: (i) first, the tools to boost growth and 
investment are not well-defined, understood or integrated into the CP framework or the broader EU 
policy and funding framework; (ii) second, the suggested reforms could imply a divergence from, and 
thus undermine CP core objectives of economic, social and territorial cohesion. 
Moving forward, the EU should reframe the relationship between ESI Funds and economic governance 
with a political vision that goes beyond structural reforms and macroeconomic conditionality and fully 
espouses the wider objectives and policies of the European Union. 
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5 A prospective roadmap 
The final section presents a road map to overcome the challenges described in section four. It also 
argues in favour of integrating the relationship between ESI Funds and EU economic governance 
objectives as part of a wider EU growth strategy. 
5.1 The objectives 
Building upon the findings of the previous section, we first define a short list of concrete needs or 
objectives that need to be addressed. We latter present an agenda to help strengthen the link between 
ESI Funds and the EU’s economic governance objectives. 
5.1.1 More clarity 
Conditioning the use of structural funds to the implementation of growth-enhancing reforms has the 
potential to highlight ‘EU added value’ in supporting the EU’s growth and investment agenda.  
However, there is a need to recognise that this direction for a suggested CP reform agenda is not 
universally supported or well understood across the CP community. Given this lack of ownership, 
there is a risk that the ongoing post-2020 debate is characterised by entrenched positions from 
different CP constituent groups. This, in turn, risks limiting the extent to which the debate about the 
Policy’s future can be underpinned by truly innovative and progressive options. 
Against that backdrop, the conditionalities underpinning CP need to be further clarified and integrated 
into a more compelling narrative that re-states the political rationale of CP reform. In this context, it 
is also essential that a positive consensus is reached regarding the key features and the direction for 
the Policy, in pursuit of CP’s enduring goals and principles. 
5.1.2 Focus on added value 
Considering its strong relevance for the growth and investment agenda and the high level of scrutiny 
of the CP, proposals aiming to strengthen the links between the ESI Funds and the economic 
governance agenda are likely to represent a major item of the negotiations on the future MFF. As a 
result, this agenda could represent an opportunity for the Juncker Commission to be “more ambitious 
on big things, and smaller and more modest on small things.”53 
However, delivery will only match this level of ambition if the reform agenda rests upon a strong, 
positive narrative as to why it constitutes an area where the EU can provide added value. A stronger 
political ownership of this agenda is necessary to ensure that the rationale for the CP reform is well-
connected to the EU’s future growth and investment agenda.  
5.1.3 More alignment with the wider EU framework 
The context of the post-2020 MFF review opens a window of opportunity for a new deal to be struck 
between EU member states on a revamped CP, positioning it more clearly vis-à-vis the wider spectrum 
of EU policies. The linkages between ESI Funds, structural reforms and economic governance 
objectives hinge upon a set of interdependencies, whereby any change in each policy can generate 
externalities across the EU’s territories. 
                                               
53 European Commission (2014), “A New Start: European Commission work plan to deliver jobs, growth and investment”, Press Release, 
Strasbourg, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2703_en.htm  
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It is essential to link any specific reform of the way ESI Funds are distributed with the wider CP reform 
agenda and to link it to the EU’s future priorities. This approach could help integrate CP, but also the 
whole MFF, in a more connected operating framework able to boost the impact of the EU budget.54 
This also assumes a wider reform of the EU’s economic governance system to provide greater 
oversight and alignment of other growth-orientated EU policies. 
5.2 Recommendations 
Moving forward, we have identified four sets of recommendations to address the challenges identified 
in section four in line with the objectives described above. In summary, these are: 
1. To clarify the added value of EU action in regions 
2. To provide a stronger rationale for growth-enhancing reforms  
3. To lay out how ESI Funds can contribute to the EU’s growth and cohesion objectives 
4. To build a stronger regional ownership of the EU’s economic governance agenda 
5.2.1 Recommendation 1: Clarify the added value of EU action in regions 
a) Put the reforms into perspective: the upcoming negotiations on the post-2020 Multiannual 
Financial Framework are an opportunity to address the challenges mentioned in the introduction 
and present a new set of priorities that can fit with a reduced budget. Sparked by Europe’s “poly-
crisis“55 there is also an ongoing reflection on the future of Europe.56 This provides an opportunity 
to reposition the role of Cohesion Policy in this new context and to clarify how CP can add value, 
through ESIF, to the achieving of a range of objectives – such as growth and investment or 
macroeconomic stability – which would benefit the EU as a whole. 
b) Set the level of ambition: the EU budget has only limited leverage to foster structural reforms in 
the richer member states. Equally, the restricted budget of Cohesion Policy and the addition of 
objectives assigned to the policy over time leave limited room for developing new financial 
incentives. Finally, proposals need to be politically realistic and consider the challenges for both 
the member states and the Commission to apply sanctions to countries experiencing 
macroeconomic imbalances. 
c) Build a consensus based on evidence and positive incentives: in an overall context of mistrust 
among EU countries and vis-à-vis the Commission on the implementation of the enhanced 
economic governance system, the new reform agenda needs to rely on sound and strong evidence. 
Furthermore, there is a need to address the perceived ‘punitive’ approach underpinning the 
‘corrective arm’ of MEC. This should be replaced by positive incentives and a more positive 
narrative to drive commitments and align efforts.  
5.2.2 Recommendation 2: Provide a stronger rationale for growth-enhancing reforms  
a) Link structural reforms to a new, comprehensive, EU growth strategy: there is an urgent need to 
develop a new EU growth strategy in an inclusive and participatory way that fully engages all EU 
stakeholders. This would help clarify the nature and the purpose of structural reforms and the 
priority areas where EU funds should be invested. To ensure stronger ownership of this agenda, 
                                               
54 Huguenot-Noël, Robin, and Hunter, Alison, ‘Cohesion Policy: how can the EU sustain solidarity and investment at the same time?’ in 
European Commission, “Cohesion Policy looks to the future”, Panorama Summer 2017 N° 61, Brussels, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/panorama/pdf/mag61/mag61_en.pdf 
55 Emmanouilidis, Janis A and Zuleeg, Fabian (2016), “EU@60 - Countering a regressive and illiberal Europe”, EPC Issue Paper, European 
Policy Centre (EPC), Brussels, http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?cat_id=1&pub_id=7020  
56 See the White Paper and subsequent reflection papers. European Commission (2017), “White Paper on the Future of Europe: the way 
ahead”, Brussels, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/white-paper-future-europe/white-paper-future-europe-way-ahead_en  
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all EU policies and programmes supporting it should be better aligned with national and regional 
growth strategies.  
b) Position Cohesion Policy as the champion of the EU’s investment and solidarity agenda. A new 
rationale would help address concerns about the lack of clarity of CP objectives and challenge the 
perceived lack of profile of the Policy (in comparison to other, sector-specific, budget lines). A 
stronger identification with the EU’s structural reform agenda would help clarify the logic 
underpinning the introduction of conditionalities in CP.57 Equally, conditionalities should be 
assessed in the light of their ‘transformational impact’ and applied in a proportionate way so as to 
ensure that they fully embrace the solidarity dimension of the CP mandate. 
c) Clarify the role of structural reforms vis-à-vis CP objectives: The Commission should build 
stronger evidence on the structural reforms that can help achieve the CP objectives of economic, 
social and territorial cohesion. Pre-conditions on the use of ESI Funds should target objectives that 
are consistent with the goals pursued by CP and avoid links to ‘exogenous’ types of conditionality, 
such as ‘political conditionality’ (e.g. on the implementation of the rule of law) or other types of 
reforms that do not fit in the remit of the CP’s mandate.  
d) Extend the conditionality on growth-enhancing reforms to other EU policies and programmes: 
the European Semester process is considered to have placed undue pressure on the role and 
influence of CP and the ESIF. A new EU growth strategy would need to clarify what role CP should 
play in that agenda, how ESI Funds can help deliver on those objectives, but also what should be 
the role and pre-conditions attached to the use of other financial instruments – such as the 
Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI) and the future 
Research & Innovation (R&I) Framework Programme. This more holistic approach should also help 
avoid competition between EU funding tools. 
e) Build on the creation of the Structural Reform Service Programme to support growth-enhancing 
reforms through the EU budget: the SRSP, which will link EU financial support requested by 
member states to the implementation of CSRs, represents a good example of the kind of 
mechanisms that could be developed in the next programming period. Moving forward, the 
experience of the SRSP should be used to inform the development of similar EU funding tools. 
Several options have been suggested regarding how such fund could work in practice. For example, 
the Commission’s reflection paper on the future of EU finances highlights that such fund could 
“either be reinforced under cohesion policy or established under a new, stand-alone fund open to 
all member states”.58 Such fund would need to be a genuine ‘structural reform fund’ cutting across 
all EU growth-enhancing policies. This would have the advantage of increasing the leverage of the 
EU budget in fostering the implementation of structural reforms both in traditional beneficiaries 
of CP but also vis-à-vis richer member states.  
5.2.3 Recommendation 3: Lay out how ESI funds can contribute to the EU’s growth and cohesion 
objectives 
a) Build the evidence for conditionalities linked to reforms boosting growth and cohesion: ex-ante 
conditionalities are gaining widespread support for the role they can play in facilitating the 
implementation of reforms ‘on the ground’. There is now a need to build stronger evidence on 
how ex-ante conditionalities can help implement the kind of structural reforms that will help 
Cohesion Policy deliver on objectives of its original mandate. 
b) Set out the case for MEC and a wider reform of the economic governance system to deliver on 
the growth-enhancing reform agenda. This requires explaining how MEC may support the 
                                               
57 John Bachtler et al (2017)  
58 European Commission (2017), “Reflection Paper on the Future of EU Finances” 
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implementation of growth-enhancing reforms. Considering the existing controversies about the 
impact of MEC, the effectiveness of MEC must first be assessed against the objective of supporting 
the establishment of a sound macroeconomic environment. Notwithstanding the political 
pressures and challenges concerning a continued role for MEC, more constructive mechanisms 
should be explored to link the use of ESI Funds with a country’s macroeconomic performance. This 
requires looking at the drivers for macroeconomic imbalances and considering how MEC or similar 
mechanisms could help incentivise the implementation of the kind of structural reforms which can 
effectively help tackle them. 
c) Explore the scope to turn MEC into an ex-ante conditionality: the upcoming debate concerning 
the EU’s funding strategy post-2020 provides an opportunity to review the MEC mechanism. This 
is also an opportunity to explore, with the CP community and other stakeholders involved in the 
post-2020 MFF negotiations, whether its value may be better positioned as an ex-ante mechanism, 
i.e. as a tool incentivising member states to achieve a sound business environment. 
Considering the high share of pre-allocation of ESI Funding, this new mechanism should consider 
non-financial incentives. It could, for example, give an increased flexibility in ESIF implementation 
for member states fulfilling the conditions related to macroeconomic and fiscal criteria at the 
start of the programming period. Accordingly, countries struggling to respect these conditions 
could be required to use a higher share of ESI Funds for conducting the kind of reforms which are 
deemed to improve their business environment.59 
An ex-ante MEC mechanism would have the advantage of mutually reinforcing the two existing 
conditionality instruments (MEC and ExAC). It would also facilitate the monitoring of how ex-ante 
conditionalities help improve the macroeconomic environment and thus the effectiveness of  
the Funds. It could finally help reposition MEC as an ‘enabler’ for the EU’s growth-enhancing 
reform agenda. 
However, in light of the controversies about the existing MEC mechanism, the authors of this paper 
wish to stress that the effectiveness of a ‘revamped MEC’ is unlikely to prove successful if it fails 
to address the concerns expressed by the different communities. For this, any proposal aimed at 
moving towards increased MEC should (a) be able to rely on compelling evidence that ESIF-related 
conditionalities can contribute to the objective of creating a sound macroeconomic environment; 
(b) be tested with the stakeholders involved in the negotiations of the post-2020 MFF and the CP 
community. Considering the usual constraints surrounding MFF negotiations (see “The limits of 
Realpolitik”), we recommend that consultations on this proposal start as soon as possible.  
5.2.4 Recommendation 4: Build a stronger regional ownership of the EU’s economic governance 
agenda 
a) Propose a wider reform of the economic governance system: to increase regional ownership of 
the structural reform agenda, there is a need to clarify how the European Semester, CSRs and 
conditionalities on the use of ESIF are linked to long-term development strategies in member 
states and regions. A possible option would be to turn the economic governance system into a 
multi-annual framework which create more robust connections to the European Semester 
including PAs, NRPs, structural reforms, CSRs and ESI Funds.  
  
                                               
59 The reforms aimed at ‘institutional and administrative capacity building’ identified in the context of existing ESIF-related ex-ante 
conditionalities could serve as a useful indicator for determining what reforms should be prioritised, in collaboration with the managing 
authorities. 
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b) Provide a multi-level governance framework for growth-enhancing reforms: to respond to the 
perceived lack of ownership, there is a need to better integrate national and subnational players in 
the definition and implementation of the kind of structural reforms that the EU can support through 
ESIF. This could, for example, take the form of a new assessment framework aimed at identifying 
the nature of the structural reforms that should be prioritised for each member state and what 
should be the contribution of each level of governance to their delivery. This framework could be 
extended to a more tailored analysis of the contribution of each region, for example, in highly 
decentralised member states (e.g. Germany, Italy or Spain). 
c) Integrate territorial and cross-border impact assessments in the European Semester: There is 
currently no regional or cross-border dimension in the CSRs and the European Semester process 
does not currently provide for a tailored approach looking at the role played by regional authorities 
in implementing Cohesion Policy. Territorial and cross-border impact assessments could prove 
helpful to ensure stronger coherence between EU policy objectives.60 
***************************************** 
This study has demonstrated that to strengthen the link between EU structural funds and the EU’s 
economic governance objectives, there is first and foremost a need to build a clearer narrative of what 
EU’s economic governance objectives aim to achieve. 
Against this backdrop, these recommendations focus on positioning structural reforms at the heart of a 
new EU growth strategy in an inclusive and participatory way that fully engages all EU stakeholders. As 
our analysis has shown, the priority is to boost ownership by member states and regions of the EU’s 
economic governance agenda and alignment of their public investment with commonly agreed objectives. 
In light of this, our package of supporting measures could help deliver greater clarity, visibility and a 
more compelling narrative for the EU to champion this agenda. 
                                               
60 Committee of the Regions (2016), “Simplification of ESIF from the perspective of Local and Regional Authorities”, Brussels. 
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6 Conclusion 
This study assessed the extent to which European Structural and Investment Funds could further foster 
growth-enhancing reforms as well as a sound macroeconomic environment. It looked at the existing 
ex-ante and macroeconomic conditionality instruments and considered whether and how these 
provisions should be extended in the next programming period. 
Our analysis has revealed that the recently introduced macroeconomic conditionality mechanism is 
increasingly seen as conflicting with the traditional CP objectives of investment and growth. This 
problem is compounded by the lack of a shared understanding across regions and stakeholders on the 
content and purpose of structural reforms. The perceived misalignment of EU tools and objectives 
fuels confusion and doubt among the CP community at both national and regional levels about the 
ownership and credibility of existing conditionality measures. 
Our analysis, however, shows that conditionality instruments could play a more positive and enabling 
role in generating the growth and investment-friendly conditions which the EU requires. To do so, the 
EU should build a clearer narrative based on concrete evidence showing how conditionalities can help 
deliver on structural reforms. Impact assessments must be undertaken to demonstrate the role played 
by ex-ante and macroeconomic conditionalities in member states and regions, ahead of the next 
multiannual financial framework negotiations. 
MEC remains subject to several controversies. Disagreements on the ‘conflicting’ outcomes targeted 
by MEC are persistent among stakeholders and the level of commitment to MEC remains ambiguous. 
The next MFF is an opportunity to review the effectiveness of MEC. One should consider the possibility 
to turn it from an ex-post to an ex-ante mechanism, especially as support for the ExAC appears stronger 
in that regard. 
Nevertheless, there is a risk that any attempt to move towards increased macroeconomic conditionality 
without the appropriate consideration for the ownership of Cohesion Policy could frustrate the 
‘conditionality agenda’ or thwart the much-needed debate on the reform of Cohesion Policy. 
To overcome these challenges, we suggest that the Commission reposition the rationale for EU action 
and clearly set out a positive and prospective agenda for change. This means proactively addressing 
the concerns around MEC by taking a more constructive approach that would prevent unrealistic 
expectations from arising as to the extent to which the EU budget alone can help deliver on the EU’s 
growth and investment agenda. 
In light of this, we propose that the Commission take a role of ‘strategic enabler’ in the implementation 
of the EU’s growth agenda by re-positioning structural, growth-enhancing reforms at the heart of a 
new growth strategy for the EU. This new growth strategy could bring forward the possible ‘multiplier 
effect’ of targeting ESIF towards enabling reforms, and reposition CP as the EU’s main tool to sustain 
investment and solidarity at the same time in the new era. 
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